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foreign exchange market on April 1, 1998. This paper examines how the bid-ask spread and conditional
volatility in the yen/dollar foreign exchange market changed around the time of the deregulation. Intra-day
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deregulation was associated with a convergence of Japanese quoted spreads toward those of other banks.
(2) Modeling the persistence in volatility reveals that deregulation lowered conditional volatility.
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1. Introduction
The “Big Bang” of Japanese financial markets was proposed in November
1996 by the Hashimoto government. This was the beginning of the end to the
“convoy” system—no failure and regulatory protection—that had ruled the
Japanese financial markets since the end of the Second World War. It is a
bold idea to deregulate and liberalize the financial sectors, if not belatedly.
There were three main objectives. First, the Big Bang aims at making
the Japanese market more efficient and internationalized. The market will
become more active and competitive, and users, such as the Japanese
corporations and retail consumers, will be beneficiaries. Second, the Japanese
institutions, with competitive pressures from foreign institutions, will have to
become more efficient.  Third, it would deflect the political pressures,
representing vested interest, on the Ministry of Finance.
After the bubble burst, the Tokyo financial markets had been losing its
steam. The Tokyo Stock Exchange lost more than half of its capitalization
since the peak of the bubble (December 1989). There had been a mass exodus
of foreign stock listings from the Tokyo Big Board. The trading volumes of the
Tokyo foreign exchange market have not been growing in the 1990s, and
Hong Kong and Singapore were catching up fast. The usage of the yen in Asia2
has not grown as some economists had predicted, partly because of the
cumbersome rules and regulations in Tokyo. The first motivation of the Big
Bang was to stop the skidding of Tokyo as an (if not ‘the’) Asian financial
center.
Making the Tokyo markets efficient does not necessarily mean that the
Japanese institutions will flourish. If foreigners have a competitive
advantage in financial products, then they will take greater market shares in
Tokyo. It must be endured, the policy makers argued. However, it was hoped
that intensified competition would make Japanese institutions more efficient
and stronger. The second objective, which derives from the first one, was
more nationalistic, but try to force Japanese financial institutions to try
harder.
Although the objectives were unanimously hailed as appropriate and
desirable, the timing of the announcement was not so obvious.  The Ministry
of Finance was heavily criticized for its role in first creating and then
bursting the bubble and not guiding the banking industry through the sea of
nonperforming loans. First, the Ministry tried to maintain the “convoy”
system, not failing one bank by forcing banks to share the burden and
allowing banks to postpone provisioning and sales of bad assets, and then
abandoning it without an sufficiently funded safety net (deposit insurance
system). The Big Bang is a constructive way to steer attention away from the
sorry past to a bright future.3
The rest of this paper will examine the contents of the Big Bang,
discuss its likely effects, and present some econometric analysis of early
indications in the foreign exchange market.
2. What is the Big Bang?
The Ministry described the spirit of the Big Bang as “fair, free, and global.”
Obviously, the main objectives of the Big Bang are to make the Japanese
financial markets more competitive and to provide Japanese institutions with
more opportunities than fetters.  When the Big Bang is implemented,
transaction costs will be substantially reduced, and those who are using the
Tokyo markets, mostly institutions in Japan, will benefit from deregulation.
However, many observers point out that there may be more political (or
political economy) objectives.  First, the Big Bang is sequenced so that it will
take some time to complete it, but will be carried through to the end. The
foreign exchange controls were effectively eliminated on April 1, 1998.
Nonfinancial institutions in Japan can deal in foreign exchange without
banks’ intermediation. Moreover, Japanese investors are now allowed to open
and maintain accounts with financial institutions in foreign countries.
Without change, Japanese banks will lose a large chunk of formerly-protected
businesses to New York and London. The Big Bang starting with the foreign
exchange deregulation will ensure that the rest of the reforms will be carried
through.4
Politically, the Big Bang may have been a response to various scandals
among the Ministry officials. The revelation that some high-ranking officials
were caught in near-bribery scandals put the Ministry on the defensive.
Proposing and carrying out a high-profile project like the Big Bang may
deflect media attention. (Despite the effort, the Ministry of Finance continued
to be criticized in the media, since new scandals erupted in 1997.)
The name Big Bang is misleading as the proposal is not a sudden
change. The foreign exchange control was effectively eliminated in April
1998. But, other reforms in banking, securities, and insurance sectors are
scheduled to follow. The accounting standard will also be changed, but that
will take time, as public accountants have to be educated on the change first.
Economic benefits from the Big Bang will extend to an entire financial sector
and the economy in general when the reforms are completed.
Traditionally, domestic deregulation had been stalled by vested
interests of segmented financial markets. The Big Bang is a final answer to
deal with the crash of vested interests. Several examples will give a good
picture of the financial markets problem and the proposed solution.1
First, banks and securities firms are at odds. Banks opposed securities
houses desire to make customers’ securities accounts more like bank accounts
(automatic deposits, demand deposits, and automatic payment services) –this
was removed in the beginning of the 1990s.
                                                
1 For the market structure before deregulation, see Ito (1992, chapter  5)5
Second, Securities houses opposed banks’ plan to sell mutual fund
products at banks’ teller windows—this was removed in December 1998.
Third, ordinary banks and long-term credit banks were squabbling
over the ordinary banks’ product line. Long-term credit banks opposed the
ordinary banks’ proposal to offer time deposits exceeding two years—this was
removed in the mid-1990s.
In general “holding companies” are prohibited in Japan. Under the Big
Bang, the establishment of financial holding companies will be permitted, so
that banks, securities firms, and insurance companies may be controlled and
coordinated by a single headquarter.
Insurance companies are segmented into three categories: Life
insurance, non-life insurance, and the “third” category—such as cancer
insurance. This segmentation will be lifted in March 2001, under the Big
Bang.2 Insurance premiums have been regulated and controlled. Under the
Big Bang, companies can charge different premiums to different kinds of
customers (e.g. non-smoker life insurance, drivers without accident records).
Among the changes in the foreign exchanges on April 1, 1998, the
elimination of the exclusive dealing by banks is most prominent. Foreign
exchanges had been exclusively exchanged in banks that are licensed to do
dealings. Securities firms, trading houses, and other large nonfinancial
                                                
2 United States pressure has been instrumental in much deregulation in Japan in the 1980s.
However, it is ironic that the United States is now opposing deregulation of insurance
segments in Japan, because AIG (a U.S. company) has a vested interest in the “third”
market.6
companies regularly receive both buying and selling orders of foreign
exchange. However, they cannot offset (marry) their buy and sell positions,
but ask banks to do the transactions. Then the banks automatically receive
commissions. This restriction was removed on April 1, 1998 as a part of the
Big Bang. In addition, investors are now allowed to hold accounts at financial
institutions abroad. These changes have put additional competitive pressure
on Japanese banks.
In order to disentangle the vested interest turf claims, the Big Bang—
simultaneous or at least committed schedule of, deregulation—is the answer.
3. Political Economy
The Big Bang idea was an attempt of the Hashimoto government, with help
from some quarters of the Ministry of Finance, to pursue structural reforms
in domestic and international economic policy making. The domestic politics
needed some banner for the Hashimoto government (since January 1996).
Public opinion had turned against the Ministry of Finance, as the final
resolution of the insolvent Jusen (housing loans companies) required an
injection of 685 billion yen, and some Ministry officials were alleged to have
accepted cash and lavish entertainment.
During the summer of 1996, it was proposed to reform the Bank of
Japan to make it more independent from the Ministry. This was considered
to be a deflection of criticism.7
The Big Bang had several additional political advantages. First,
domestic resistance toward deregulation and liberalization would become less
when a “declaration” for the big deregulation is made internationally. Second,
it helps international negotiations. The U.S. had pressured Japan to “open
up” the insurance market. In fact, the U.S. demands were aimed at keeping
the Japanese insurance market under regulation. The so-called third market
(for non-life insurance) was dominated by the U.S. insurance companies.  As
a result, the US opposed the deregulation of that market. The Big Bang
basically set the deadline for allowing such vested interest.
Immediate impacts on various groups of consumers are unclear.
Wealthy individuals will benefit from the wider-range of choices in their asset
portfolios. However, small savers including pensioners may suffer from
deregulation as the various rates (brokerage commissions, insurance
premiums, bank monthly fees) will be differentiated for different types of
customers.
We now turn to the statistical evidence on how the first step of the Big
Bang, namely the foreign exchange market deregulation, is affecting the yen-
dollar exchange rate market.
4.  A First Look at  the Deregulation of the FX Market
On April 1, 1998 the revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law  ended the monopoly of Japanese banks in Japanese foreign8
exchange (FX) trading.  Now other firms, such as general trading firms, and
individuals may freely buy and sell foreign currencies.  The law extends down
to the retail level, where shops and restaurants may exchange foreign money
for yen.  The revised law also permits individuals to open and maintain
foreign-currency-denominated bank and securities accounts in foreign
countries.3 At first thought, it seems reasonable that the deregulation should
generate a yen depreciation, as the interest rate in Japan was so much lower
than in other countries.  However, the expected effect on the volatility of the
yen/dollar exchange rate is unclear.
In the weeks before the deregulation went into effect, market
participants expressed the opinion that the yen should weaken as it will be
easier for Japanese agents to sell yen for dollars.  However, there were
persistent rumors of central bank interventions, selling dollars to prevent the
dollar appreciation, so it is possible that the effect of private market yen sales
was offset by central bank purchases.  There were also confounding factors,
as the time of the deregulation was one where other important events were
occurring.  For instance, on April 3, Moody’s Investors Service downgraded to
“negative” from “stable” its outlook for Japan’s government obligations.  This
news resulted in the yen/dollar exchange rate dropping to 135 for the first
time in over six years.  In the same week, the Bank of Japan’s Tankan report
indicated that the outlook had turned more negative among Japanese firms.
                                                
3 Even before the big bang, foreign-currency-denominated deposits could be made with
Japanese or foreign financial institutions that were located in Japan.9
So, it is clear that there was plenty of news to motivate yen selling around
the time of the deregulation, so that one must be careful when making claims
about the effects of the April 1 change.  We will now turn to a first look at the
empirical evidence related to the FX market big-bang.
Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate
With the lifting of restrictions on dollar-denominated deposits in
foreign countries, we expect that pressures from abroad will force the
Japanese and foreign institutions in Tokyo to offer better products.  This may
cause a shift to dollars from yen and a consequent yen depreciation.  In a real
sense, any such depreciation is reflecting expectations regarding the
Japanese economy and financial market differences between Japan and the
United States (like interest differentials and stock market performance).  The
deregulation should simply allow more Japanese firms and households to
diversify their portfolios at lower cost. To see whether there was any
discernible effect of deregulation on the yen/dollar exchange rate, we first plot
the daily data in Figure 1.  The figure indicates that in the week containing
the deregulation, the yen depreciated against the dollar from about 130 to
135.  However, there was a sharp appreciation in the following week which
appears to have been a result of two factors.  The Bank of Japan intervened
in support of the yen and, reportedly, sold $12 billion in exchange for yen on
Thursday and Good Friday.  At the same time, U.S. Treasury Secretary10
Rubin stated that he supported the Bank of Japan action and was concerned
about recent weakness in the yen. There was also an expectation among
market participants of a coordinated intervention to support the yen
following the G7 meeting scheduled for April 15.  All of these factors
contributed to the yen appreciation below 130 in the second week of April.
However, as Figure 1 shows, by the third week of April, following no action
by the G7, a steady yen depreciation began that peaked in June.
Aside from the yen appreciation prior to Easter weekend, it is clear
that the yen depreciated over most of the period starting in mid-February.
While this could have been due to expectations and the consequent
realization of portfolio rebalancing following April 1, there was also plenty of
bad news related to the Japanese economy that occurred at the same time.
Transaction Costs
One would expect that deregulation increases efficiency as banks face
greater competition so that spreads and commissions on trading fall. There
was anecdotal evidence that this occurred. Banks cut the foreign exchange
commission charged to retail customers.4 Securities firms cut exchange rate
commissions for preferred customers who purchase foreign-currency
denominated bonds.  Aside from such anecdotal evidence from the retail level,
what do the data say about the wholesale interbank market?11
We examined tick-by-tick data on the yen/dollar exchange rate for
evidence regarding spreads.5  First, we plotted the average daily quoted bid-
ask spreads for Japanese banks and all banks in Figure 2.  It is interesting to
note that the Japanese quoted spreads exceed the rest of the market. There
may be several reasons why Japanese banks’ spreads are wider. First, they
may be just inefficient. Second, Japanese banks’ reputation was categorically
damaged when one of the 20 large banks failed in November 1997, and many
others had been downgraded. The Japanese banks were charged a “Japan
premium” by American and European banks. Credit lines were severely cut.
Unless the Japanese banks offered a higher rate, they could not borrow. A
look at the figure does not provide obvious evidence that the spreads
narrowed following the April 1 deregulation.  Neither the spreads of all
quoters nor those of Japanese quoters systematically fell after April 1.
Furthermore, it is not obvious that the spreads quoted by Japanese banks
converged to those quoted by others following April 1.
The two spikes in the spread series for all quoters are related to
specific events.  The first spike occurring on March 13 coincides with the
arrest of a senior BOJ official for leaking sensitive information and the
ensuing corruption scandal. The second peak occurred on Good Friday (April
10).  This is to be expected as there was heavy BOJ intervention on this day
                                                                                                                                                
4 For instance, at the end of March, Daiwa Bank reduced its exchange commissions so that it
charges ¥28,000 to purchase $10,000.  This was ¥2,000 below the other Tokyo city banks. On
April 6, Sanwa Bank cut its foreign-currency wiring fee by up to 2,300 yen.12
and the Easter weekend is a 3-day holiday weekend in many countries. With
much uncertainty regarding action by the G7 the next week and an extended
market closing, we should expect the widening spreads.  Note that spreads
fell sharply the next week, following the lack of action by the G7.
To more formally examine the effect of the deregulation, we estimated
econometric models of the spread.  Microstructure models suggest that
volume and volatility should both be important determinants of the spread.6
In addition, a dummy variable was added to estimate the impact of the April
1 deregulation.  The dummy switches from zero to one on April 1.  The model
is estimated twice.  First, we estimate the effect of volume, volatility, and
deregulation on the average daily spread quoted by Japanese banks.  Then
the model is reestimated using the difference between the average daily
Japanese quoted spreads and the average daily quoted spreads across all
banks.  The independent variables used in the estimation are as follows: (a)
volume, the sum of daily volume in the spot and swap markets in Tokyo; (b)
volatility, the absolute daily change in the yen/dollar spot rate; and (c) the
dummy for deregulation.  To account for the simultaneity in the data, an
instrumental variables estimation was employed where the instruments
included  two lags of volume and volatility and a dummy variable for the
April 10 intervention by the BOJ. A specification search revealed that a
                                                                                                                                                
5 The data were obtained from Olsen & Associates in Zurich and include the intradaily
quotes over the first half of 1998.
6 See Hartmann (1998) for an analysis of the relationship between the tick-by-tick spread
and trading volumes.13
parsimonious representation of the data required a first- and second-order
autoregressive term be included to account for the autocorrelation in the
residuals.
The results are reported in Table 1.  Volume seems to have no
significant effect on either dependent variable.  Volatility has a significantly
positive effect on the Japanese quoted spread and no effect on the difference
between Japanese and all spreads.  The April 1 dummy has a negative and
significant effect in both cases.  So taking account of the volume and volatility
effects on the spread, one can estimate a negative effect of deregulation on
the quoted spread of Japanese banks.  In addition, it appears that, holding
constant the effects of volume and volatility, the deregulation was associated
with a convergence of Japanese quoted spreads toward those of other banks.
The efficiency gains associated with FX market deregulation in terms
of lower transaction costs, appears to extend beyond the retail level.  The
evidence presented here is supportive of a structural change in the wholesale
exchange rate quotes consistent with lower transaction costs in Japan.
Volatility
The net effect that deregulation should have on FX volatility is unclear
from the Figure.  On the one hand, the entry of more participants might add
depth and larger liquidity trades, so that that discrete price jumps occur less
frequently.  The usual case that volume and volatility are positively14
correlated is, at least in part, a result of both being driven by news.  It is not
necessary that the deregulation will increase trading volume as firms can
now take positions internally that were previously accomplished through
bank trading rooms.  This could result in thinner trading.  The next section
will examine the evidence on volume, here we look directly at volatility.
Figure 3 plots the daily (9 a.m. to 4 p.m., Tokyo) return on the yen/dollar
exchange rate.  There is no clear pattern of volatility after April 1 compared
to before.  The negative spike on April 10 is associated with BOJ
intervention. Since the table does not reveal any obvious effect of
deregulation, we will examine more formal evidence.
It is well known that high-frequency exchange rate data exhibit
GARCH effects.7  As a result, we do not want to simply look at the pattern of
the unconditional volatility to make inferences regarding the path of
volatility around April 1.  Instead, we report estimates of GARCH models.
We constructed a data set of 15-minute returns for the yen/dollar spot rate
during Tokyo business hours, ensuring that no overnight or weekend returns
were included.  This is the dependent variable in the mean equation. As is
usually the case in high-frequency exchange rate applications, a
GARCH(1,1)-MA(1) model represented the data well.  To test the hypothesis
that the April 1 deregulation resulted in lower volatility, we included a
dummy variable that switches from zero to 1 on April 1 in the conditional
variance equation.  To account for the volatility associated with the BOJ15
intervention, an additional dummy variable was added that takes on the
value of one for April 10.
Estimation results are reported in Table 2.  The diagnostics indicate
that the model represents the data well.  The deregulation dummy is
negative and significant at the 4 percent level.  Thus, accounting for the
persistence that exists in intradaily exchange rate quotes, we find evidence
consistent with the deregulation reducing volatility.
Volume
Since non-bank firms can now hold dollar deposits after April 1, 1998,
they can circumvent the bank exchange services and finance dollar deals
directly.  For this reason, we might expect that the volume of foreign
exchange trading in Tokyo would fall with the April 1 deregulation.  To
explore the pattern of FX trading volume we examine the Bank of Japan data
on daily volume.  The BOJ collects daily data from brokers and dealers on
interbank foreign exchange transaction volume.  Spot volume for the first
half of 1998 is plotted in Figure 4.  Forward and swap volume is plotted in
Figure 5.  The spot volume data in Figure 4 indicate a clear outlier associated
with the pre-Easter intervention.  Aside from this, there appears to be an
uneven decline in volume for about a month, after which volume starts to
climb again.  The swap market volume indicates a similar upward trend near
the end of the sample.
                                                                                                                                                
7 See Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) for a survey.16
To isolate the effect of deregulation on volume, we would ideally need
to account for information flows as volume (and volatility) is driven by public
and private information disclosure.  Lacking data on such information flows,
we experimented with alternative models of volume being driven by volatility
and a dummy for the April 1 deregulation.  There were no robust results
linking volume to the deregulation. It appears that other factors dominate
the volume effect.
Overall Effects of Deregulation on FX Market
Based on our look at the wholesale interbank FX market, we can
discern the following:
(1) There is evidence of lower transaction costs associated with yen/dollar
trading.  The data suggest that, holding constant the effects of volume and
volatility, the bid-ask spread drops on yen/dollar quotes.  In addition, the
difference between spreads quoted by Japanese and non-Japanese quoters
narrows after the deregulation.
(2) There is evidence that the deregulation lowers conditional volatility.
While the direct effect of deregulation on volatility is unclear, the data
indicate that a GARCH framework that takes account of the persistence in
volatility and intervention captures a negative effect.
We urge caution in interpreting these results as there were many
factors affecting the exchange rate over this period and deregulation was but17
one.  Nevertheless, it is useful to know that the effects of deregulation extend
beyond the retail level of FX that has been discussed in the popular press.
5.  Concluding Remarks
The Big Bang alone will not be enough to put the Tokyo financial markets to
the status at par with New York and London, or to make the yen an
international key currency.8 However, it is an important first step. When
accompanied by tax law changes and improvement in financial
infrastructure, complete deregulation on business activities, known as the
Big Bang, will increase financial activities in Tokyo (by both Japanese and
non-Japanese institutions), and will boost the use of the yen. However, it
remains to be seen whether these changes are made in time.
This paper examined how the bid-ask spread and conditional volatility
in the yen/dollar exchange market changed at around the time of
deregulating the foreign exchange law. Some evidence of an impact of
deregulation on the market activities was detected. However, whether the
econometric evidence can be translated into more tangible results in the long
run is obvious.  The answer partly depends on the success of the remaining
changes scheduled under the Big Bang.
                                                
8 For steps toward internationalization of the yen, see Ministry of Finance (1999).18
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Independent Variable Japanese Quotes Japanese-All Quotes
Constant 0.0836 (0.00) 0.0006 (.97)
Volume 1.6x10-7 (0.69) 7.8x10-7 (0.13)
Volatility 2.657 (0.00) -0.947 (0.24)
Dummy (deregulation) -0.008 (0.00) -0.009 (0.00)
AR(1) 0.2990 (0.00) 0.3376 (0.00)
AR(2) 0.4376 (0.00) 0.3464 (0.00)
F 4.49 (0.00) 7.06 (0.00)
SSR 0.0055 0.0061
Q(24) 18.90 (0.65) 23.34 (0.38)
Note:  p-values in parentheses
Daily data for January 1998 to June 199820
Table 2
Yen/Dollar Conditional Volatility








Dummy (deregulation) -1.062 0.04
Dummy (intervention) 26.12 0.09
SSR 4.448
Log Likelihood -11126
Q(24) 29.24  (0.17)
Note: p-values in parentheses
15-minute data from January 1998 to June 199821





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5:  Daily Swap Market Volume (million yen)
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